In 2012, Mun et al. pointed out that Wu et al. 's scheme failed to achieve user anonymity and perfect forward secrecy and disclosed the passwords of legitimate users. And they proposed a new enhancement for anonymous authentication scheme. However, their proposed scheme has vulnerabilities that are susceptible to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. It also incurs a high overhead in the database. In this paper, we examine the vulnerabilities in the existing schemes and the computational overhead incurred in the database. We then propose a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility network. Our proposed scheme is secure against various attacks, provides mutual authentication and session key establishment, and incurs less computational overhead in the database than Mun et al. 's scheme.
Introduction
Global mobility network (GLOMONET) provides global roaming services for mobile user between the home agent and the foreign agent. The GLOMONET must have a user authentication scheme in which the mobile user has secure access to the foreign agent. A strong user authentication scheme in GLOMONET should satisfy the following requirements: (1) user anonymity, (2) low communication cost and computation complexity, (3) single registration, (4) update session key periodically, (5) user friendly, (6) password/verifier table, (7) update password securely and freely, (8) prevention of fraud, (9) prevention of replay attack, (10) security, and (11) providing the authentication scheme when a user is located in the home network [1, 2] .
Many user authentication schemes for use in GLOMONET have been proposed [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . In 2004, Zhu and Ma [4] proposed a simple, efficient wireless authentication scheme that provides user anonymity for wireless environments. However, Lee et al. [5] subsequently pointed out that Zhu et al. 's scheme does not achieve mutual authentication and perfect backward secrecy, and therefore cannot protect against forgery attacks. They then proposed a slight modification of Zhu et al. 's scheme. Unfortunately, Wu et al. [6] demonstrated that Lee et al. 's proposed scheme still failed to provide anonymity and perfect backward secrecy. Consequently, they proposed an improvement to overcome the weakness identified in Lee et al. 's scheme. In 2009, Zeng et al. [7] showed that Wu et al. 's scheme also fails to provide anonymity. In 2012, Mun et al. [12] showed that Wu et al. 's scheme discloses the password of legitimate users and does not achieve perfect forward secrecy. They subsequently proposed a new enhancement for anonymous authentication to overcome these security weaknesses. However, their scheme is vulnerable to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack, and incurs a high overhead in the database of the home agent.
Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the existing schemes [5, 6, 12] and show that it is vulnerable to security requirement. And we propose a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme that is resistant to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. Our proposed scheme also incurs less computational overhead in the database than Mun et al. 's scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the existing schemes, while in Section 3, we investigate the security vulnerabilities mentioned above. In Section 4, we present our proposed secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme. This scheme is analyzed and compared with other schemes in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents our conclusions.
Review of the Previous Schemes
In this section, we examine variety of authentication schemes with anonymity proposed by Lee et al. [5] , Wu et al. [6] , and Mun et al. [12] . Figure 1 shows the procedure of Lee et al. 's scheme. Their scheme comprises three phases: an initial phase, a first phase, and a second phase.
Lee et al. 's Scheme.

Initial Phase.
When a new mobile user MU wants to register with a home agent HA, he/she performs the following steps.
Step 1. Consider MU → HA : {ID MU }.
MU sends his/her identifier ID MU to HA for registration.
Step 2. HA computes PW MU = ℎ( ‖ ID MU ) and = ℎ( ‖ ID HA ) ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ID MU ) ⊕ ID HA ⊕ ID MU , where is a long random number kept by HA.
Step 3. Consider HA Step 1. Consider MU → FA : { , 1 , ID HA , MU }.
MU computes = ⊕ ℎ( ‖ ID MU ) and temporary key = ℎ( MU ⊕ PW MU ), and encrypts 1 = (ℎ(ID MU ) ‖ ‖ 0 ‖ ) using symmetric key , where 0 and are secret random numbers. And, MU sends , 1 , ID HA , and MU to FA.
Step 2. Consider FA → HA : { , , 1 (ℎ(ID MU )‖ 0 ‖ ) using private key KR FA . And, FA computes ℎ( 0 ‖ ) and session key = ℎ(ID MU ‖ ) ⊕ 0 and encrypts 5 = ( Cert MU ‖ ℎ( 0 ‖ )) using symmetric key . FA then sends 5 to MU.
Step 5. MU computes = ℎ( 0 ‖ ) and session key = ℎ(ID MU ‖ ) ⊕ 0 and decrypts ( Cert MU ‖ ℎ( 0 ‖ )) using symmetric key . If is identical to , MU authenticates FA.
Second Phase.
In this phase, MU visits FA at th session when he/she is always within this FA. MU performs the following steps.
Step 1. Consider MU → FA : { Cert MU , 6 }.
MU encrypts 6 = ( ‖ Cert MU ‖OtherInfomation) using symmetric key , where = ℎ(ID MU ‖ ) ⊕ −1 , for = 1, 2, . . . , . And, MU sends Cert MU and 6 to FA.
Step Step 4. Consider FA → MU : { 5 }.
If certificate and timestamp are valid, FA issues the temporary certificate Cert MU and decrypts KU FA (ℎ(ℎ( ‖ ID MU ))‖ 0 ‖ ) using private key KR FA . And, FA computes ℎ( 0 ‖ ) and session key = ℎ(ℎ(ℎ( ‖ ID MU ))‖ ‖ 0 ) and encrypts 5 = ( Cert MU ‖ ℎ( 0 ‖ )) using symmetric key . FA then sends 5 to MU.
Step 5. MU computes = ℎ( 0 ‖ ) and session key = ℎ(ℎ(ℎ( ‖ ID MU ))‖ ‖ 0 ) and decrypts ( Cert MU ‖ ℎ( 0 ‖ )) using symmetric key . If ℎ( 0 ‖ ) is identical to , MU authenticates FA.
Step 1. Consider MU → FA : { Cert MU , 6 }. MU encrypts 6 = ( ‖ Cert MU ‖OtherInfomation) using symmetric key , where
. . , . And, MU sends Cert MU and 6 to FA.
Step 2. If 6 is valid, FA decrypts ( ‖ Cert MU ‖ OtherInfomation) using symmetric key . If received Cert MU if identical to obtained Cert MU , FA authenticates MU.
Mun et al. 's Scheme.
Their scheme comprises three phases: a registration phase, an authentication phase, and an update phase. Figure 3 shows the procedure of the first phase. When a new MU, wants to register with HA, he/she performs the following steps.
First Phase.
MU (mobile user)
FA (foreign agent) HA (home agent)
[First and second phase]
Check: h(x 0 ‖x) M ? Step 1. Consider MU → HA : {ID MU , MU }. MU sends his/her identifier ID MU and nonce MU to HA for registration.
Step 2. HA generates nonce HA and computes PW MU = ℎ( MU ‖ HA ) and MU = ℎ(ID MU ‖ PW MU ) ⊕ ID HA .
Step 3. Consider HA → MU : { MU , ID HA , HA , PW MU , ℎ(⋅)}.
HA sends MU , ID HA , HA , PW MU , and ℎ(⋅) to MU through a secure channel. Figure 4 shows the procedure of the second phase. In this phase, for mutual authentication between MU and HA and between MU and a foreign agent FA, the following steps are performed.
Second Phase.
Step Compute: Step 
Third Phase.
The procedure followed in the third phase is depicted in Figure 5 . The steps are as follows.
Step 1. Consider MU → FA : { }. MU selects a new random number and computes ( = 1, 2, . . . , ). MU then sends and to FA.
Step Step 1. register as legitimate user to HA and obtain own PW and . And, compute ℎ( ‖ ID HA ) using PW , , ID HA , and ID .
Vulnerabilities in the Previous Schemes
Step 2. eavesdrops on and records messages { , 1 , ID HA , MU } transmitted from FA to MU.
Step 3. compute ID MU using , ℎ( ‖ ID HA ), and ID HA .
Therefore, Lee et al. 's and Wu et al. 's scheme cannot achieve anonymity [7] . Step 1. can record the message { , 1 , ID HA , MU } transmitted from MU to FA. And, as described in Section 3.1.1, can obtain the message {ℎ( ‖ ID HA ), ID HA , ID MU }.
Step 2. stole MU's smart card, inserts MU' smart card into the device, and enters the fake password PW * = 0. The smart card computes * = ⊕PW * = ℎ( ‖ ID HA )⊕ℎ( ‖ ID MU )⊕ ID HA ⊕ ID MU and obtains * by eavesdropping.
Step 3. computes PW MU using * , ℎ( ‖ ID HA ), ID HA , and ID MU .
Therefore, Lee et al. 's and Wu et al. 's scheme are disclosed password [11] .
Perfect Forward Secrecy.
Assume that an adversary obtain MU's password PW MU . Failing to provide perfect forward secrecy is as follows.
Step 1. computes using MU and PW MU and decrypts (ℎ(ID MU )‖ 0 ‖ ) using . Thus, obtains 0 , , and ℎ(ID MU ).
Step 2. computes session key 1 using 0 , , and PW MU and decrypts ( 1 ‖ Cert MU ‖OtherInformation) 1 using 1 . Thus, obtains 1 .
Step 3. computes session key 2 using 1 , , and PW MU .
Therefore 
Man-in-the-Middle Attack. In Mun et al. 's scheme, an adversary can eavesdrop on messages transmitted between
and MU. Consequently, can also successfully mount a man-in-the-middle attack as follows.
Step 1. blocks and copies the message { FA , , FA } transmitted from FA to MU. It then selects a new random number , computes , replaces message { FA , , FA } with { FA , , FA }, and sends this to MU.
Step 2. MU computes HA and FA , and checks whether FA is identical to the received FA . After checking FA , MU selects a random number and computes , a session key MF = ℎ( ) using the received , the computed , and MF = MF ( FA ‖ ). Next, MU sends the message { , MF } to FA.
Step 3. blocks and copies the message { , } transmitted from MU to FA. It then selects a new random number and computes , a session key MF = ℎ( ) using the copied To compute MU for MU, HA must find ID MU and PW MU in its own database to compute the authentication message. However, HA incurs a high overhead because of the difficulty of finding ID MU and PW MU in the authentication message. In addition, HA incurs computational cost because of the one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation used to compute the authentication message. In other words, HA computes the authentication message using ID MU and PW MU in its own database, and incurs a high overhead because it has to compare it with the received authentication message. Table 1 shows the notation used to describe our proposed scheme. Figure 6 illustrates the procedure of the registration phase. When a new MU wants to register with HA, he/she performs the following steps.
Notation.
Registration Phase.
Step R1. Consider MU → HA : {ID MU , MU }.
MU selects the identity ID MU and a random nonce MU , and sends ID MU and MU to HA for registration.
Step R2.
After receiving the registration message from MU, HA selects a random nonce HA and computes the following:
(1) HA then issues a smart card containing [ID MU , ID HA , , , MU , ℎ(⋅)] and delivers it to MU through a secure channel.
Authentication and Key Establishment
Phase. The procedure followed in the authentication and key establishment phase is illustrated in Figure 7 . In this phase, to attain mutual authentication between MU and HA, and between MU and FA, the following actions are performed.
Step A1. Consider MU → FA : {ID HA , , 1 , 2 , , MU }.
For authentication, MU selects a random nonce MU and a random number , and computes value on using ECDH. MU then computes the following:
Next, MU sends ID HA , , 1 , 2 , , and MU to FA.
Step A2. Consider FA → HA : {ID FA , , 1 , 2 , , , MU }.
FA stores the ID HA and received from MU for further communication, selects a random number , and computes the value on using ECDH. FA then sends ID FA , , 1 , 2 , , , and MU to HA.
Step A3. Consider HA → FA : {ID HA , ID FA , 3 , , }.
On receiving the authentication message from FA, HA computes the following:
HA then checks whether 2 is identical to 2 . If they are identical, HA authenticates MU. HA then computes 3 
) and sends ID HA , ID FA , 3 , , and to FA.
Step A4. FA → MU : {ID HA , ID FA , 3 , , }. FA checks ID HA , ID FA , and , and sends ID HA , ID FA , 3 , , and to MU.
Step A5. MU → FA : { MF }. MU checks ID HA and , and computes
. MU checks whether 3 is identical to 3 . If they are identical, MU authenticates HA and FA. MU then computes MF = ℎ( ) using private and public keys and MF = MF (ID FA ‖ ‖ ). Next, MU sends MF to FA.
Step A6. FA computes MF = ℎ( ) using private and public keys and MF = MF (ID FA ‖ ‖ ). FA then checks whether MF is identical to MF . If they are identical, FA authenticates MU. Otherwise, the procedure is terminated.
Update Session Key
Phase. The update session key phase is the same as the third phase of Mun et al. 's scheme, as shown in Figure 5 . Compute:
Compute: Man-in-the-Middle Attacks. Man-in-the-middle attacks are thwarted because of the authentication between MU and HA. Similarly, man-in-the-middle attacks can be thwarted by the establishment of a session key between MU and FA. Table 3 compares the performance of existing schemes with that of our proposed scheme. Our scheme incurs less communication cost than conventional schemes [4] [5] [6] . Although our scheme incurs a little more communication cost than Mun et al. 's scheme, it incurs less computational overhead in the database than Mun et al. 's scheme [12] .
Performance Analysis.
No Need for Time Synchronization. Conventional schemes use timestamps to resist replay attacks. Thus, time synchronization takes place when each entity is located in a different time zone. However, our scheme does not use timestamps, so there is no need to synchronize time between different entities.
Use of ECDH.
Conventional schemes use certificates. However, mobile devices have power limitations; low-level computation based on certificates incurs a significant overhead. Our scheme uses ECDH instead of a public key cryptosystem with certificates in order to reduce the communication overhead. ECDH provides the same security properties and uses fewer resources than a public key cryptosystem with certificates. The performance advantage of ECDH is improved further as security needs increase.
Overhead Analysis. Our proposed authentication scheme can be compared with Mun et al. 's scheme in terms of the database overhead incurred by HA as the number of devices increase. In order to compare the overhead, the following terms are defined: the number of devices is ( = 1, 10, 20, . . . , 100), the identifier stored in the database of the home agent is , the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is (it is assumed that the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is 2, thus, = 2), and, finally, the overhead in the database of the home agent is . Thus, the overhead can be expressed as = × × , that is, = 10×10×2 = 200. Mun et al. 's scheme must obtain identifier and password information from its own database in order to compute the authentication message. However, their scheme compares the authentication message to compute the identifier and password of all the mobile users stored in its own database because of the difficulty of finding identifier and password information in the authentication message. For example, in Mun et al. 's scheme, if the number of devices to be authenticated by HA is 30, the number of identifiers stored in the database of the home agent is also 30, the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is 2 (according to Mun et al. 's scheme, = 2 because of the computational cost incurred); therefore, the overhead incurred in the database of HA is = 30 × 30 × 2 = 1800. Our proposed scheme can compute the authentication message in its own database because the identifier information can be found in the authentication message. For example, in our proposed scheme, if the number of devices to be authenticated by the home agent is 30, the number of identifiers stored in the database of the home agent is also 30, the computational cost for a one-way hash function and exclusive OR operation is 1 (our proposed scheme does not incur computational cost; thus, = 1), and thus, the overhead incurred in the database of HA is = 30 × 30 × 1 = 900. Just like our proposed scheme, Lee et al. 's and Wu et al. 's scheme are the same overhead analysis. Compared to the existing scheme, our proposed scheme incurs less computational overhead in the database (Figure 8 ).
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the previous schemes and security vulnerabilities of the previous schemes. Lee et al. 's and Wu et al. 's scheme was vulnerable to replay attack, cannot achieved perfect forward secrecy, cannot provided anonymity. And Mun et al. 's scheme was vulnerable to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack, and incurred a high overhead in the database. Therefore, we proposed a secure and efficient anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in GLOMONET. Our scheme was developed using ECDH instead of the authentication mechanism used by Mun et al. 's scheme. Consequently, unlike Mun et al. 's scheme, our scheme achieves anonymity, provides perfect forward secrecy and mutual authentication, and is resistant to replay attack and man-in-the-middle attack. And our scheme incurs less overhead in the database than Mun et al. 's scheme does. In addition, our scheme does not use timestamps, and as a result, it does not need to synchronize time between different entities.
